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Hazelton’s coercive theory also has merit. She also acknowledges common deficiencies in counterinsurgency research, including the dominance of secondary sources, the reification of ‘insurgents,’ ‘people,’ and ‘government’ as monolithic actors, and the tendency to allow a comforting liberal script to cloud analysis. Linear renditions of counterinsurgency theory overstate the government’s desire to enact reforms, its ability to target them, its capability to carry through on this intent, and the relationship between such actions, popular support, and strategic victory. Hazelton also correctly identifies the idealistic assumptions of the good governance approach (85-87). Legitimacy can facilitate such control, but is rather useless without it. Though much of the discussion on hearts and minds distorts what the counterinsurgency doctrine and literature argue, Hazelton is correct that counterinsurgency is won not by the most liked, but by the side exercising the most effective control. First, it problematizes “popular support” as a war-winner. While we disagree with Hazelton’s approach, the article advances a number of insights. This finding is both ethically troubling and empirically unsubstantiated. We believe that while the work is described as “explanatory” (92), it nonetheless posits a false choice: that policymakers either accept savagery or do not engage in counterinsurgency at all. Drawing on the case of Malaya, as well as Dhofar and El Salvador, Hazelton’s article argues that this coercive theory better explains success in counterinsurgency than good governance. Success, she notes, “is the result of a violent state-building process in which elites engage in a contest for power, popular interests matter little to the outcome, and the government benefits from the use of force against civilians” (81). To challenge the good governance theory, Hazelton’s advances a ‘coercive theory’ that sees no danger, and in fact a key benefit, in violently controlling civilians as long as select elites are made to benefit from the counterinsurgent’s activities. Integral to the theory, as it is presented, is that counterinsurgents protect civilians from harm, even to the detriment of military operations, because counterinsurgency is a contest of legitimacy hence the need to shower benefits on the civilian population. This approach to counterinsurgency is associated in the article with the hearts-and-minds concept and asks governments to suppress discriminately the insurgents all the while enacting “liberalizing, democratizing reforms designed to reduce popular grievances and gain popular support” (80). This backdrop informs Jacqueline Hazelton’s article in the most recent issue of International Security, which tilts at the ‘conventional wisdom’ of modern counterinsurgency, or what she terms its “good governance” theory (80). Author’s Response (published 2 January 2018)īennett Response (published 4 January 2018)
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Fritz, American University Published by ISSF on 13 October 2017 Ucko, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, and Jason E. “The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare.” International Security 42.1 (2017): 80-113. H-Diplo/ISSF Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Jacqueline L. H-Diplo/ISSF Editors: Seth Offenbach and Diane Labrosse Still, some saw the focus on securing the population, and the associated slogan of “winning hearts and minds,” as implying a dubious and misleading promise of counterinsurgency as a “kinder, gentler war.” Critics were quick to pounce, yet tended to eschew the necessary context or confuse their own at times reductive interpretations of counterinsurgency for its ‘conventional wisdom.’ The fact that doctrine and scholarship, to say nothing of counterinsurgency on the ground, evince a more complex picture has not deterred the continued use of strawmen to launch powerful yet poorly targeted attacks. The broad consensus suggests the need to “win” the population, mostly through popular empowerment and by shielding it from violence, all the while preventing it from supporting the insurgency. In particular, the debate has touched upon the importance of winning the civilian population’s allegiance and the role of violence in protecting, or suppressing it.
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Over the past decade, the dominant view of counterinsurgency in academic and policy circles has fluctuated.